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  This research examines the behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of 
merchandising allowances.  Merchandising allowances are fees manufacturers pay 
retailers to encourage them to allocate certain in-store promotional activities to the 
manufacturers’ brand.  According to estimates, retailers collect billions of dollars in these 
allowance payments annually.  Using a three-stage game, I formulate a vertical structural 
model that endogenously models manufacturer, retailer, and consumer behavior.  
Manufacturers compete with each other, using merchandising allowance payments, in 
order to obtain premium shelf space at retail outlets.  Retailers, given allowance offers, 
choose display configurations and then set retail prices.  Consumers observe the display 
and retail prices and determine whether to purchase one or no units of the good.  I 
estimate the model with a method of moments technique using IRI scanner data from the 
ketchup industry.  In addition to estimating consumer tastes parameters, the model yields 
predictions of the underlying wholesale prices and the merchandising allowances each 
manufacturer offers.  I use the parameter estimates to conduct a counterfactual simulation 
of how agents might respond when the use of merchandising allowances is no longer 
permissible.  I find that while merchandising allowances increase retail profits, total 
welfare is lower due to the allowances. 
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 1 Introduction
The term merchandising allowance refers to a fee that manufacturers pay retailers to encour-
age them to allocate certain in-store promotional activities to the manufacturers￿brand(s).
These promotional activities include such things as an end-of-aisle display or premium shelf
space. The payments for these bene￿ts have a variety of names: slotting allowances, pay-
to-stay fees, vendor allowances, display fees, and promotional allowances. Unfortunately,
there is a lack of consensus regarding the usage of these terms.1 To avoid confusion, then,
I will simply use merchandising allowance to refer to all payments made in order to receive
preferential shelving or promotion at retail outlets.
Merchandising allowances are one component of a contract between the manufacturer
and the retailer, which typically involves the transaction or invoice price, the magnitude
of the allowance, and any other conditions involved in the transaction. The terms of the
contract would also include a quantity component. While often discussed in the context of
the grocery industry, merchandising allowances are becoming increasingly prevalent in such
industries as computer software, tobacco products, and over-the-counter drugs.
In recent years, merchandising allowances, particularly slotting allowances for new prod-
ucts, have become a source of controversy and disagreement.2 This growing interest in
allowances is largely attributable to the amount of money devoted to the practice. A 1983
Fortune magazine article on retail trade promotions estimated that spending on merchan-
dising allowances had grown from $1 billion annually in the early 1970￿ s to roughly $8 billion
at the time of publication. A 1990 study found that slotting allowance payments, alone,
accounted for up to $9 billion in annual grocery industry expenditures (Deloitte & Touche
1990). More recent reports put the current amount spent on slotting allowances at $16 bil-
lion per year (Desiraju 2001). In 1999, the tobacco industry, an industry not counted in the
1For example, Feighery et al. (1999) use slotting allowance to refer to both payments made for new
products and payments for premium shelf space for existing products, while Lariviere and Padmanabhan
(1997) use slotting allowance to reference payments for accepting new products only.
2The subject was addressed in a spring 2000 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) workshop. The workshop
allowed various participants in the grocery industry to voice their opinions on slotting allowances. A summary
of these opinions and conclusions appears in a February 2001 FTC sta⁄ report.
1Deloitte & Touche ￿gures, spent roughly $3.5 billion on allowances to retailers (FTC 2001b).
Such large dollar amounts make merchandising allowances a major source of revenue for
retailers and, conversely, a major ￿nancial consideration for manufacturers.
In this paper, I construct an interactive model of behavior in which manufacturers com-
pete for premium shelf space at retail outlets. The structural model is based on models of
vertical competition and traditional discrete-choice models of di⁄erentiated products. For-
mally modeling ￿rm and consumer behavior allows us to examine the decisions being made:
the retailer￿ s shelf space allocation, the wholesale and retail pricing strategies, and, ulti-
mately, the consumer￿ s choice of which product to purchase.
While there is a growing literature on allowances, few empirical studies have emerged to
complement the work that has been started in the theoretical papers. In the FTC sta⁄report
on slotting allowances, it was noted that ￿The few studies that have been undertaken re￿ ect
opinion...rather than empirical research,￿(FTC 2001a). Steiner (1991), writing speci￿cally
about merchandising allowances, con￿rms the FTC￿ s statement by noting that, "A strange
property of the entire vertical restraints literature is the absence of empirical investigations
of the role of manufacturers￿promotional allowances." The lack of rigorous empirical analysis
is the largest gap in the allowance literature. This research represents a step towards ￿lling
the gap.
The structural model presented below allows for estimates of manufacturer wholesale
prices and merchandising allowances. Using the parameter estimates, I conduct a policy
simulation to determine how wholesale prices, retail prices, and, ultimately, consumer surplus
respond to alternative scenarios. The primary counterfactual involves examining how ￿rms
and consumers respond to an alternative state where merchandising allowances are illegal or
forbidden. This will help us address allowances￿ultimate impact on consumers; the prices
they pay.
I ￿nd that the presence of merchandising allowances decreases welfare. Using a measure
of consumer surplus, I ￿nd that, on average, each consumer/household experiences a slight
welfare reduction. The individual loss aggregates to a national total of roughly $10 million.
2This result is driven by the fact, in the absence of merchandising allowances, manufacturers
are more likely to adjust (downward) their wholesale prices in order to compete for the
premium shelf space.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I review the rele-
vant literature on vertical restraints, allowances, shelf space allocation, and in-store product
marketing. In Section 3, I describe the precise timing or stages of the model and introduce
the vertical structural model. To estimate the empirical model, I use data on ketchup sales.
For background purposes, Section 4 presents a brief history of the ketchup industry and a
summary of the major industry participants. Section 5 contains detailed information regard-
ing the data used in this study. The estimation procedure is detailed in Section 6. Section
7 contains estimation results and analysis of the parameter values and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Research on merchandising allowances overlaps the boundaries of several academic disci-
plines, therefore, a number of relevant literature sources need to be addressed. These are
the literature on vertical restraints, slotting allowances, marketing and advertising studies
on the impact of shelf space, and literature on structural discrete-choice models.
2.1 Vertical Restraints
There has been considerable work in the economics literature on vertical restraints.3 Of
particular interest to this research is the work that has examined manufacturer behavior
when sales of the manufacturer￿ s product depend, in part, on the level of "service" provided
by downstream retailers. These "services" are activities designed to increase a brand￿ s sales,
such as advertising or in-store display. However, there might be a tendency for a retailer to
"under-provide" the service, particularly if it is costly or if there is ample opportunity to
free-ride o⁄ those retailers that provide the service.
3I o⁄er only a brief overview of the literature. For a more thorough discussion, please see Steiner (1991).
3Within this context, a number of papers, including Bowman (1955), Telser (1960), Math-
ewson and Winter (1984), and Winter (1993), have examined optimal manufacturer strate-
gies. The primary question, essentially, is whether a particular vertical restraint, such as
resale price maintenance (RPM), promotional allowances, or exclusive territories, would be
su¢ cient to induce the retailer to provide the desired level of service. Both Bowman (1955)
and Telser (1960) argue that manufacturers would bene￿t from using direct payments, as
opposed to RPM. Bowman argues that we may not observe this as often, however, because
of a concern that these lump-sum allowances violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
As the Fortune magazine article clearly demonstrates, the reliance on merchandising
allowances has grown substantially since publication of Bowman and Tesler￿ s articles. And
yet, as Steiner points out, there remains an absence of empirical work on manufacturers￿
promotional allowances. This research represents a step towards addressing that concern. In
this paper, I assume that manufacturers use merchandising allowances to induce the retailer
to provide a promotional service, namely improved shelf space.
2.2 Slotting Allowances
Within economics, there is a small but expanding base of literature on slotting allowances.
The ￿rst papers on slotting allowances were published in the early 1990s. Economists focused
on examining the di⁄erent roles slotting allowances play in the vertical channel. With these
di⁄ering models have come con￿ icting welfare predictions.
Sha⁄er (1991) compares slotting allowances, resale price maintenance, and standard Nash
equilibrium pricing in an e⁄ort to determine which practice is more pro￿table for retailers.
Sha⁄er, using a three-stage pricing game with homogeneous manufacturers and di⁄erentiated
retailers, shows that, compared to an environment with no slotting allowances, the retailers
earn more pro￿t and consumers pay higher retail prices when a lump sum slotting allowance
is used. While worse than marginal cost pricing, Sha⁄er also shows that the use of RPM
results in a higher social surplus than lump-sum slotting allowance payments.
Another avenue of research has examined the role slotting allowances may play in sig-
4naling the quality of a manufacturer￿ s brand to a retailer. Given the several thousand new
grocery products developed each year, all vying for limited shelf space or limited promotion
e⁄orts, manufacturers can use a slotting fee to signal (to the retailer) their belief about the
quality of their product. Most practitioners (including the studies below) assume manu-
facturers, because of market research and analysis, have better knowledge than the retailer
about consumer demand for their product. Chu (1992) examines two di⁄erent games: one
in which manufacturers signal their quality through advertising expenditures and another
in which the retailer screens the manufacturers￿quality (to eliminate low quality goods) by
requiring slotting allowance payments. While the ￿rst case results in higher prices, Chu
shows that retail prices will not increase when the retailer uses slotting allowances to screen
for manufacturer-type. In Chu￿ s equilibrium, only high-quality goods are willing to pay the
allowance, so lower-quality goods disappear from the market and total welfare increases.
Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997), while also examining the role allowances can play in
signaling quality, alter the game presented in Chu by allowing manufacturers to o⁄er slotting
allowances to the retailer. These allowance o⁄ers are intended to signal product quality as
well as reimburse the retailer for a portion of the cost associated with stocking the product.
Lariviere and Padmanabhan, in specifying a separating equilibrium, show that the optimal
behavior for a high demand manufacturer is to o⁄er a positive slotting allowance and a lower
wholesale price.
While most papers on slotting allowances examine the role slotting allowances play in the
vertical channel and its e⁄ect on pro￿ts and retail prices, Desiraju (2001) is one of the few
papers to focus on comparing the strategies retailers may use to set the magnitude of slotting
allowance payments. Desiraju compares two di⁄erent methods a retailer might plausibly use
to set slotting allowances: one in which allowances are determined ￿brand-by-brand￿(i.e.
each manufacturer pays a di⁄erent slotting allowance) and another in which all products
pay a uniform allowance. Desiraju, following the convention used in Chu and Lariviere and
Padmanabhan, classi￿es new products as being a product for which consumers have either
a high or low attraction. Desiraju solves for the optimal retailer-manufacturer contract
5under a number of di⁄erent scenarios (ex. asymmetric information regarding the market
attractiveness of the new product, and exogenous wholesale prices) and ￿nds that brand-
by-brand allowances are preferable regardless of whether there is symmetric or asymmetric
information about a product￿ s attractiveness, but actual slotting allowance payments are
larger in magnitude in the uniform allowance case. Desiraju￿ s model also makes a prediction
about retail margins that my empirical model can address. Desiraju predicts that retail
margins and slotting allowances should be negatively correlated.
At the heart of these slotting allowance models is the notion that the retailer takes on risk
when agreeing to carry a manufacturer￿ s brand. Retailers incur several costs when agree-
ing to accept a new product: e.g. stocking costs, computer costs, opportunity cost. Some
products will ultimately fail or sell below expectations and an allowance can be thought of
as a means of transferring some costs back to the manufacturer. Sullivan (1997) models the
use of slotting allowances in the context of product failure and shows that allowances may
be a⁄ective tools in risk-sharing and are consistent with a situation wherein the supply of
goods far outpaces sales growth. Additionally, Sullivan o⁄ers historical data on the number
of products introduced by manufacturers, retail prices, margins, and retail pro￿t to anecdo-
tally contradict Sha⁄er￿ s claims that slotting allowances have negative welfare implications.
Sullivan shows that in 1970, there were roughly 1,800 new products introduced. By 1990
this number had grown to around 16,000 products annually. According to the logic presented
in the theoretical model, if new product introductions have increased substantially (i.e. if
the supply of products has increased), then slotting allowances may, in fact, be an e¢ ciency
enhancing mechanism that both decreases the tendency of manufacturers to develop new
products and increases the number of products a retailer would be willing to carry.
While there has been greater understanding of the roles allowances play, the studies above
illustrate that there is no clear consensus with regard to welfare implications.4 Are allowances
an e¢ ciency-enhancing mechanism, as Sullivan might argue, or are they welfare-reducing,
as Sha⁄er might argue? In an e⁄ort to answer this question, Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon
4Azzam (2001) addresses this by proposing an empirical model which can be used to test the e⁄ect slotting
allowances have on price-cost margins.
6(2000) conduct a survey of participants in the grocery industry (both manufacturers and
retailers).5 The respondents were asked about their level of agreement or disagreement with
a number of statements regarding slotting allowances, such as ￿Retailer product assortments
are often based on slotting fees￿or ￿Slotting fees have come about as a result of greater
retailer in￿ uence.￿The respondents were also asked a set of questions regarding the e⁄ect
slotting allowances have had on the industry, such as ￿What e⁄ect have slotting fees had on
the prices charged by retailers?￿Not surprisingly, Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon ￿nd mixed
reviews: manufacturers tend to see slotting allowances as symptomatic of retail-power, while
retailers tend to view slotting allowances as fair or e¢ cient.6
2.3 Marketing and Advertising Literature
Relevant literature in the marketing and advertising ￿elds focuses primarily on two speci￿c
areas: how retailers allocate shelf space and the impact that shelf space has on retail sales.
The work devoted to examining how retailers determine shelf space allocation typically
involves developing a mathematical algorithm in which a retailer compares his expected
pro￿ts under all possible shelving combinations. Whether these models are static (Borin,
Farris, and Freeland 1994) or dynamic (Corstjens and Doyle 1983), the main idea is that the
retailer has limited space to store goods and must, then, determine which mix of products
earns him the greatest pro￿t.
Chen et al. (1999) models the retailer optimizing his shelf space allocation (across all
product categories) in order to attract the most consumers, by increasing the probability
that a consumer will be able to ￿nd his or her preferred brands. The assumption is that the
more shelf space (as measured in linear feet) category j has at retailer i, the more likely it is
that the consumer will be able to ￿nd his or her preferred brand (in category j) at i￿ s store.
The models of this type overlook some important decision variables, however. The most
5Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon also provide a thorough summary of the numerous pro- and anti-
competitve arguments on slotting allowances.
6Smaller manufacturers are particularly upset about slotting allowances. As MacAvoy (1987) shows,
large manufacturers may actually wish to use slotting allowances to raise the price of shelf space in order to
foreclose rivals from the market.
7glaring omission is their failure to incorporate merchandising/slotting allowances or other
types of incentives. In addition, a number of the important decisions, such as the retail
margins or mark-ups, are exogenous to the retailer. Finally, the models in this particular
vein of the literature ignore the decision of where the chosen products should be placed on
the shelf.7 It makes no di⁄erence whether a product is displayed on the top, bottom, or
middle shelf; at the checkout counter or in the store￿ s back corner.
Since shelf space allocation models do not address the importance of positioning, the
natural question to ask is whether shelf space location actually matters to sales. According
to the literature, the answer is yes. Several studies have used reduced form models to
estimate the impact of shelf space on price elasticity (often referred to as ￿space elasticity￿ ).
These studies conclude that shelf space does matter, but its magnitude may not be that
large compared to other variables, such as price (Frank and Massy 1970, Curhan 1972, and
Bommer and Walters 1996)). A cross-category study by Chiang and Wilcox (1997) also ￿nds
a strong correlation between dollar sales and the shelf space allocation.
DrŁze et al. (1994) is one of the few papers that draws a clear distinction between shelf
space, measured as the number of facings or store-keeping units (SKUs), and the position of
the product on the shelf. After conducting a series of ￿eld experiments at sixty Dominick￿ s
Finer Foods stores in the Chicago area, they conclude that the position on the shelf is far
more important, in determining sales, than the number of facings.8 While this result is
promising, the majority of work has largely overlooked the role that positioning can play in
retail sales. Areni, Duhan, and Kiecker (1999) use ￿eld and laboratory experiments to test
whether point-of-purchase displays increase sales of the featured brand. Their paper does
not attempt to model consumer behavior explicitly, however, so it is di¢ cult to generalize
from their ￿ndings.
7Instead, the focus is on choosing the optimal number of facings for each brand.
8DrŁze et al., in fact, state that ￿A couple of facings at eye level did more for a product than ￿ve facings
on the bottom shelf.￿
82.4 Discrete-Choice Structural Models
The modeling technique used in this paper is based on discrete-choice structural models of
di⁄erentiated products. The majority of recent papers in this research area, such as Chinta-
gunta, Dube, and Singh (2003), Manuszak (2000), and Nevo (2001), can trace their roots to
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes (1995, henceforth BLP). The modeling technique
pioneered by Berry and BLP has changed demand estimation for two principle reasons: the
random coe¢ cients approach adopted to model consumer heterogeneity alleviates the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem that has plagued logit models and provides
a solution to the problem of endogenous prices. As a result, models in the likeness of Berry
and BLP produce more accurate price elasticities and unbiased coe¢ cient estimates.
The majority of these empirical discrete-choice models fail to di⁄erentiate between man-
ufacturer and retailer behavior, however. Retailers are included only to the extent that they
place a ￿xed mark-up on the wholesale price. For example, BLP focuses on price-setting be-
havior at the manufacturer level in their paper on automobile prices. Similarly, Nevo models
the manufacturers of ready-to-eat cereal, but does not model the supermarkets. Given the
nature of merchandising allowances, it is essential to model the behavior of both manufactur-
ers and retailers, separately, for they both make decisions critical to understanding the role
slotting allowances play. A few papers, however, such as Besanko, Gupta, and Jain (1998),
Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2000), and Chintagunta, Dube, and Singh (2003) have formally
modeled both the upstream and downstream ￿rms in the vertical channel. In these models,
manufacturers set a wholesale price for the product and retailers, taking the wholesale price
as given, set the retail price as some mark-up over the wholesale price.
3 The Model
3.1 The Game
Manufacturers compete with each other over premium shelf space at retail outlets. Each
manufacturer o⁄ers a merchandising allowance to the retailer in exchange for an agreement
9to devote premium shelf space for the manufacturer￿ s brand. Retailers are assumed to
be ￿local monopolists￿and have enough shelf space to stock each brand.9 However, each
retailer can devote premium shelf space (an eye-level shelf allocation or end-of-aisle display,
for example) to only one brand.10
The interaction between manufacturers and retailers is modeled as a three-stage game. In
the ￿rst stage of the game, each manufacturer j makes their o⁄er to the retailer. Each o⁄er is




j). The ￿rst wholesale price (w
j
j) is the per-unit wholesale price manufacturer
j receives if the retailer selects brand j for the premium shelf space. The second wholesale
price (w0
j) is the per-unit wholesale price manufacturer j receives for its product if another
brand, instead, receives the premium space. In the second stage, the retailer receives the
o⁄ers from all J manufacturers, evaluates expected pro￿t under each display con￿guration,
and decides which brand to position in the premium space. In the third stage, the retailer
sets a retail price (pj) for each of the J brands.
Figure 1 illustrates a simple duopoly version of this game in which two manufacturers
compete for premium shelf space at a monopolist retailer. I now discuss the full structural
model, beginning in the game￿ s ￿nal stage (consumer choice) and working backwards to the
manufacturer￿ s behavior.
3.2 Utility and Demand
A consumer i = 1;:::;I visits a retail store in market m = 1;:::;M and chooses either to
purchase one of the J brands in a given product category or chooses not to purchase any
of the brands. Each brand j has two attributes: (xj;pj), where xj is a vector of K visible
attributes, and pj is the price. The indirect utility consumer i in market m obtains from
purchasing product j is given by:
9Allowing for competition downstream might produce interesting results as downstream competition could
potentially dampen the relative power of the retailer. However, Slade (1995) ￿nds that over 90 percent of
households do not engage in comparison shopping between grocery stores in order to ￿nd the lowest price.
Therefore, the assumption of a local monopoly does not seem inappropriate.
10The inherent idea present in this model can be easily summarized by what one marketer familiar with
the grocery industry told me: ￿the days of supermarkets doing things, without being paid, are long gone.￿
10uijm = xj￿i ￿ ￿ipjm + "ijm (1)
The coe¢ cients (￿i;￿i) capture consumer i￿ s tastes for attributes x and price p. The
term "ijm is a mean-zero stochastic term capturing consumer i￿ s idiosyncratic utility from
product j and is assumed to be distributed type II extreme value.
Consumers also have the ability to by-pass purchasing any of the o⁄ered brands. This is
referred to as purchasing the ￿outside good￿or the ￿no purchase￿option. For identi￿cation
purposes, I normalize the indirect utility from the outside option to be:
ui0m = "i0m (2)
The multinomial logit model displays the well-known independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA) problem. The IIA problem refers to the restrictive (unrealistic) substitution
patterns imposed by the logit model. Several econometric techniques have emerged to cor-
rect the IIA problem, such as the nested logit model. I choose to adopt a random coe¢ cients










A + ￿Di + ￿i; ￿i ￿ N(0;1)
where (￿;￿) are the mean preferences for price and observable characteristics, Di is a
d ￿ 1 vector of observed consumer characteristics, ￿ is a (K + 1) ￿ d matrix of coe¢ cients
that illustrate how tastes for product characteristics vary with consumer attributes, and ￿i
represents additional characteristics of consumer i which are not captured through demo-
graphic information and are unobservable to the econometrician. Inclusion of ￿i accounts for
the possibility that individuals with identical demographic characteristics may still have dif-
ferent tastes for price and observable characteristics. The ￿i are assumed to be independent
from Di and are distributed iid standard normal.
11Nevo (2000) presents a useful overview of the intricacies of the random coe¢ cients logit model. This
paper has bene￿ted greatly from Nevo￿ s work.
11The consumer is assumed to purchase one unit of the good which provides the highest
expected utility from all of the goods in his choice set. In other words, consumer i will
purchase brand j if:
U (Di;xjm;pjm;"ijm;￿i) ￿ U (Di;xkm;pkm;"kjm;￿i) 8k 6= j
This speci￿cation ignores an important component in the demand for products: the shelf
space allocation. To accurately address the question why manufacturers would be willing to
pay for premium shelf space, we must try to understand how premium space a⁄ects sales. To
model the way in which shelf space a⁄ects the consumer￿ s discrete product choice decision,
consider the factors that enter a consumer￿ s decision whether to purchase or not. Clearly,
if a consumer is more likely to purchase a brand when it is on display, then the consumer￿ s
perception of the brand must somehow be di⁄erent (holding all else constant). To this end,
we might think that consumers view a brand di⁄erently depending upon whether that brand
has premium shelf space or not. Possible explanations are that a brand on display may be
perceived as being more popular or of a higher quality.12
To capture consumer taste for each brand (independent of product characteristics), I
use brand-speci￿c dummy variables. As Table 1 shows, ketchup, the product used in this
research, is essentially a homogeneous good. It seems likely, then, that brand dummies
will capture consumer tastes for each brand in a manner that cannot be captured through
product characteristics.13
An advantage of using brand dummies is that it eliminates the need to use instrumental
variables to account for the endogeneity of prices. Many of the discrete-choice structural
models follow BLP￿ s convention and introduce an unobserved (to the econometrician) prod-
12An alternative approach could be to allow shelf space to inform consumers about the existence of a
particular product. The shelf space allocation, therefore, would determine a consumer￿ s choice set. Goeree
(2001) takes this approach in modeling the e⁄ects of advertising on the demand for personal computers.
Because ketchup is the product used in this paper, I feel that knowledge of available options is less of an
issue than it may be in other categories.
13One problem with the use of ￿xed e⁄ects is that any variation in tastes across markets will be overlooked.
It will not be possible, for example, to determine whether there is a di⁄erence between how Heinz is perceived
in Pittsburgh and how it is perceived in Atlanta.
12uct characteristics term (￿j) into the indirect utility function. Because the retail price is
likely to be correlated with these unobserved product characteristics, econometricians have
been forced to employ instrumental variables estimation techniques in order to obtain un-
biased estimates. Since ketchup is a homogeneous good, I argue that unobserved product
characteristics are captured through the brand dummies. This eliminates the necessity of
using instruments.
To allow a consumer￿ s tastes for each brand to vary depending on whether that brand is
on display or not, two ￿￿ s per brand are estimated: one capturing the mean taste for brand
j when it is on display (￿
j
j) and another capturing the mean taste for brand j when another
brand is featured (￿
0
j).
In order to account for this possibility, I allow each brand￿ s observable characteristics
(brand dummies) to vary according to whether the brand is on display or not. The proba-






















ij represents consumer i￿ s taste for brand j when brand j is on display, ￿
0
ik represents





retail price of brand j (k), conditional upon brand j being the displayed brand.14 In a simi-
lar manner, the probability that a consumer i in market m purchases brand j when another
















By estimating these di⁄ering taste components, we gain insight into the perceived dif-
ferences between a brand with premium shelf space and that same brand in an unfeatured
















13higher perceived quality when in the premium position). Empirical results will indicate not
only whether this assumption is valid, but will also help determine the magnitude of any
perception ￿boost.￿
By integrating over the distribution of demographics, I obtain conditional market shares
(sjm) for each brand in each market.
3.3 Behavior of the Firms
3.3.1 The Retailer￿ s Problem
A retailer takes the o⁄ers from all J manufacturers and decides how to allocate the premium
shelf space by comparing the expected pro￿t earned under all possible display con￿gurations.
Retailer r￿ s expected pro￿t, conditional on choosing to feature manufacturer j￿ s brand, is:
￿rjD=j = ￿j + Aj + ej (5)
In this manner, the retailer￿ s expected pro￿t can be thought of as having a variable
component, a merchandising allowance component, and a ￿xed component. The variable
component (￿j) is the amount of pro￿t that depends on the retailer￿ s optimal pricing and
output choices. Aj is the merchandising allowance o⁄er from brand j. The retailer, by
design, collects an allowance only from the chosen brand. The (￿ej) term can be thought of
as a display-speci￿c ￿xed cost.15 The display and retailer-speci￿c ￿xed cost might encompass
such things as the fact that certain contracts may require the building of displays, certain
brands may require more time to stock or unpack, employees may need to be trained for
certain promotional activities, etc. at a particular retail outlet. The retailer knows the true
value of the ￿xed cost it faces, but manufacturers only have knowledge about the distribution
of these ￿xed costs.
We can further characterize the expected pro￿t retailer r receives when displaying brand
j as:




























k) is the wholesale price of brand j (k) when brand j has been chosen for display,
Aj is the lump sum allowance paid by manufacturer j, and QjjD=j (QkjD=j) is the demand
for brand j (k) when brand j is chosen for display. The conditional demand for brand j is
equal to MsjjD=j, where M is the size of the market and sjjD=j is the share of consumers
purchasing brand j when brand j is on display.




k (8k 6= j) by solving the

















































For J brands, the retailer will generate a system of J ￿ J conditional prices.16 The
speci￿cation of retail pro￿t presented in equation (5) allows the retailer￿ s display-selection
problem to be analyzed in a familiar discrete-choice setting. This enables the probability
that brand j is chosen (for display or feature) by retailer r to be calculated. Let ￿jr represent
the (conditional) probability that manufacturer j is chosen by retailer r:
￿jr = Pr(D = j)
= Pr(￿j + Aj + ej > ￿k + Ak + ek 8 k 6= j) (7)
The retailer chooses to feature the brand that yields the highest expected pro￿t. In the
two good case (j = 1;2), the probability that brand 1 is chosen would be given by:
16Each brand will have a conditional price for each possible display choice and one there will be a display
choice for each brand.
15￿1r = Pr(￿1 + A1 + e1 > ￿2 + A2 + e2)
= Pr(e2 ￿ e1 < ￿1 ￿ ￿2 + A1 ￿ A2)















f(ei ￿ ej)d(ei ￿ ej) (8)
Making an assumption about the distribution of the e￿ s allows for analytical computation
of this probability. A more thorough discussion of this assumption and its implications
appears in Section 6. I now turn to the manufacturer￿ s problem.
3.3.2 The Manufacturer￿ s Problem
The pro￿t-maximizing manufacturer faces two problems: choosing conditional wholesale
prices (w￿ s) and a lump sum merchandising allowance (A) to o⁄er retailers. The selection

























































































































While the expressions might look complicated, the intuition is rather straightforward:
if manufacturer j changes the conditional wholesale price w
j
j, for example, the conditional
pro￿t (￿m
jjD=j) would be impacted, but so would each of the display probabilities (￿j for all
j = 1;:::;J). It is necessary, however, to brie￿ y discuss the derivative of sales with respect
to wholesale price (
@Qj








Evaluating the ￿rst term (
@Qj
@pj ) is relatively straightforward in the logit model. The
second term (
@pj
@wj), however, requires some additional explanation. As Besanko, Dube, and
Gupta (2003) point out, in the structural models of vertical competition, there has not been
a consensus regarding the value of
@pj
@wj, which they call the retailer￿ s ￿pass-through￿rate.
For example, Besanko, Gupta, and Jain (1998) assume that the own brand pass-through (
@pj
@wj) is 1 and the cross brand pass-through (
@pj
@wk) is 0.18 Sudhir (2001), on the other hand,
assumes that pass-through rates are between 0 and 1 (or between 0 and -1 if referring to
17For simplicity, I will temporarily ignore the superscript associated with the conditional display choices.
18A common way this assumption is justi￿ed is by saying that the retailer sets a mark-up (m) over the
wholesale price he receives. Therefore, p = m + w, so
@p
@w = 1.
17cross brand pass-throughs) and are inversely proportional to market share. Sudhir￿ s result
can be easily shown using properties of the logit model.
As Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003) do, I evaluate the pass-through rates by totally
di⁄erentiating the retailer￿ s pro￿t maximizing ￿rst-order conditions. This is speci￿cation is
less restrictive than some alternatives and appears to be supported by empirical evidence (
Besanko, Dube, and Gupta 2002).
Recall that, in addition to the wholesale prices, the manufacturer selects a merchandising
allowance to o⁄er the retailer. To determine the optimal merchandise allowance, each man-
ufacturer, again, maximizes its expected pro￿t (E￿m
j ). The optimal allowance o⁄er, then,


















Notice that the chosen merchandising allowance o⁄er not only a⁄ects manufacturer pro￿t,
conditional upon having its brand chosen for display, but also a⁄ects the probability that a
given brand is chosen for display.
The system of J2retailer ￿rst order conditions and 3￿J manufacturer ￿rst order conditions
characterize the equilibrium.
4 The Market for Ketchup
I have, thus far, kept the model as general as possible, so it might be applied to di⁄erent
products or industries. To conduct the empirical examination, however, it is necessary to
choose a particular product or category. This paper estimates the structural model using
data from the ketchup industry.
Ketchup is a fairly homogeneous product. Though there are over twenty brands of ketchup
currently produced in the U.S., most brands use only slightly di⁄erent formulas or ingre-
dients. The market is dominated by three national brands: Heinz, Del Monte, and Hunts.
Heinz is the clear industry leader with approximately a 55 percent market share. The com-
18bined market share of Heinz, Hunts, and Del Monte is roughly 82 percent.19 In 1992, the
￿nal year in my data set, ketchup sales in the U.S. were $723 million.
There are several aspects of the ketchup market that make it attractive for this empirical
study. First of all, with Heinz being a clear market leader in many markets, one would expect
there to be rivalry between the remaining ￿rms, competing for the residual consumers. It
is commonly believed that powerful market leaders are often exempt from allowances and,
instead, it is the second and third place brands that, ultimately, end up paying or o⁄ering
the highest amounts. By estimating allowance o⁄ers, the model allows me to empirically
evaluate this belief. The display probabilities will also show whether it is the market leader
receiving the premium space most often or one of the rivals.
According to industry reports, annual sales in the ketchup industry are generally ￿ at,
neither growing nor decreasing noticeably from year to year. In fact, Figures 2 and 3 show
that ketchup sales are slightly declining over my sample period. As Sullivan argued, slow
sales growth, in part, may contribute to the use of merchandising/slotting allowances in this
category.
5 Data
To estimate the model presented in this research study, data on a number of di⁄erent elements
are necessary. In general, the data can be divided into several broad categories: brand
unit sales in each market, brand market shares, prices of each brand for each market, the
percentage of a brand￿ s units sold through merchandising e⁄orts in each market, brand
characteristics, and demographic information.20
19This ￿gure does not include the ￿Private Label￿brand. Section 5 contains more information about the
combined market share of these three brands.
20I adopt the notation of Nevo (2001) and de￿ne a "market" as a city-quarter combination.
195.1 Sales Data
The variables unit sales, prices, and the percentage of units sold with merchandising (PUAM)
were obtained from the Food Marketing Policy Center￿ s IRI Infoscan Data Base.21 Founded
in 1979, IRI is a sales and marketing research ￿rm that uses supermarket checkout ￿scanners￿
to collect sales data in a national random sample of supermarkets. These supermarkets are
located throughout the U.S. The IRI data used in this research ranges from the ￿rst quarter
of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1992 (20 total quarters) and includes 40 metropolitan areas.
The full dataset, therefore, covers 800 markets. A list of the included metropolitan areas
appears in Table 2. It is important to note that the IRI data are reported at the aggregate
level for each market. This means two things: that all Heinz ketchup bottles sold, regardless
of size, are recorded as one brand and that there is no distinction (in the data) between
di⁄erent retailers.22 Unit sales, then, refer to the number of items, for a particular brand,
scanned at the grocery store checkout. Because of variation in bottle size and, therefore,
price, the price reported by IRI represents an average price per unit, which is calculated
as a brand￿ s total dollar sales divided by the total unit sales. The ￿nal IRI variable, the
percentage of units sold with merchandising, is necessary because information on allowance
spending is closely guarded by ￿rms. According to IRI￿ s description, this measure represents
the percentage of a brand￿ s sales directly attributable to merchandising/display e⁄orts at
the retail level. For the purposes of this research, I assume that sales attributed to ￿any
merchandising￿can be thought of as sales resulting from being the retailer￿ s featured brand.
Therefore, the number of units sold due to any merchandising e⁄ort is assumed to equal the
number of units sold while the product is the retailer￿ s featured brand. Information about
the use of this variable appears in Section 7. Summary statistics for the three IRI variables
appear in Table 3.
The model is estimated using the four top selling brands of ketchup: Heinz, Hunts, Del
21My thanks to Dr. Ronald Cotterill, director of the Food Marketing Center at the University of Con-
necticut, for making the data available.
22Cohen (2001) has shown that manufacturers may use product size as a way to price discriminate between
consumers, based on storage or transportation costs. The aggregate level data in this research, however,
does not allow me to account for this possibility.
20Monte, and retailers￿Private Label. The ￿rst three are national brands, while the fourth
typically refers to a lower-priced brand that displays the name of the supermarket on its
label. Private Label brands can be thought of as vertically integrated brands in which the
supermarket is not only the retailer, but also the manufacturer.23 As such, I assume that
the Private Label brand pays no wholesale price or merchandising allowance. The retailer,
therefore, receives no merchandising allowance payment if the Private Label brand is selected
for display. The remaining brands of ketchup are omitted. As Table 3 shows, Heinz, Hunts,
Del Monte, and Private label, combined, have a national market share of roughly 98 percent.
Looking at combined regional market shares (for Northeast, South, Midwest, and West), the
four top brands have market shares between 94 percent and 99 percent.
Observable product characteristics for ketchup are readily available and have not changed
in any signi￿cant way since the sample period. Observable product characteristics that we
might initially be interested in are quality measures such as calories and sodium per serving.
Due the high level of homogeneity in ketchup, however, there is virtually no variation in
product characteristics across brands.24 This makes identi￿cation of the consumers￿taste
for sodium or calories, for example, impossible. As stated in Section 3, brand dummies will
be the only product characteristics used in this study.
5.2 Demographic Data
Data on demographic distributions were obtained through the Census Bureau￿ s Current
Population Survey (CPS). The CPS has been used by the Census Bureau since the late
1940￿ s to collect data on the U.S. labor force. The CPS sample selection process is designed
to ensure accurate representation across metropolitan areas and participation in the survey
is completely voluntary. Survey respondents are asked to provide personal information on a
number of measures, including age, educational attainment, family size, employment status,
housing situation, and occupation (as well as many others).
23Technically, the private label brand may be produced by an independent manufacturer, but strategically,
it behaves like a subsidiary of the retailer.
24Several product characteristics are presented in Table 1 to illustrate the homogeneity.
21In this study, I use CPS demographic information on two variables: a household￿ s total
income and the number of children in the household under the age of 18.25 The household
income level should be an important factor in determining consumer price sensitivity. Be-
cause ketchup is commonly used with ￿fun food￿(hot dogs, hamburgers, french fries), we
might imagine that a household￿ s demand for ketchup depends, in part, on the number of
children present in the household. A thorough discussion of how demographic data is used
in calculating brand choice probabilities appears in an appendix.
As Table 3 shows, there is a degree of variation in sales across geographic regions. This
might be due to di⁄erences in demographics across the regions, although it seems likely that
other (unobserved) factors may be in￿ uencing this result. To help control for this varia-
tion, I use a dummy variable to indicate those CPS respondents residing in "Northeastern"
markets.26
6 Estimation
In this section, I outline the algorithm used to estimate the model presented in Section 3.
For notational convenience, let me de￿ne the vector of parameters to be estimated as: ￿ =
f￿;￿;￿;￿g. I begin by choosing initial starting values for the parameters in ￿. For these
parameter values, I compute the implied market shares as a function of price for each brand
and each display choice: sjjD=k = sjjD=k(pk
j;pk
￿j). Because random coe¢ cients are used to
allow for heterogeneity in the choice probabilities, computing the shares requires simulating
a multidimensional integral. The simulation technique employed to evaluate this integral is
similar to Nevo (2001) in that I will, for each city, sample a number of individuals from the
CPS. Details on this sampling technique appear in an appendix.
The next step is to numerically solve the system of retailer and manufacturer ￿rst order
conditions to determine the pro￿t-maximizing merchandising allowances and the conditional
25Ideally, I would like to include more than two demographic characteristics. Unfortunately, because of the
high computation time involved in estimating my model, it is necessary to restrict the number of demographic
characteristics included.
26Therefore, the vector Di is 3 ￿ 1 for each i.
22wholesale and retail prices associated with each possible display choice. The prices can then
be used to calculate the implied (conditional) sales for each brand under each possible display
choice. Using the price-quantity pairs, I calculate the variable portion of retailer pro￿t (￿j).
Using the retailer￿ s sales (variable) pro￿t and the merchandising allowances, I compute
the unconditional display probabilities (￿), where computation of this (J ￿ 1) dimensional
integral is simpli￿ed by assuming that the e￿ s are distributed type II extreme value, which




k expf￿rjD=k + Akg
The model is estimated using a method of moments technique. So, the next step is to use
the information above to derive expected values for the expected average per unit price, the
expected brand market share, and the expected percentage of units sold with merchandising
(PUAM), where:


























E (QjjD = j) R
e (QjjD)Pr(D = dje)dF(e)
(15)





b p ￿ pIRI
b S ￿ SIRI




Finally, I search for the parameter values that minimize the objective function !0W!,
where ! is an (800 ￿ 3 ￿ 4) ￿ 1 vector of residuals and W is an (800 ￿ 3 ￿ 4) ￿ (800 ￿ 3 ￿ 4)
weighting matrix. For the ￿rst iteration of the objective function, W will be an identity




Coe¢ cients for price and the brand dummies appear in Table 4. For each brand j, the two
coe¢ cients reported represent the brand-e⁄ect when on display (￿
j
j) and the brand-e⁄ect
when a rival is on display (￿
0
j). I refer to the di⁄erence between the estimated coe¢ cients
as the brand￿ s ￿quality boost.￿These quality boosts are positive for Heinz, Hunts, and Del
Monte, indicating that consumers, on average, tend to have a better perception of these
brands when they appear on display. The Private Label brand actually has a higher brand-
e⁄ect when not on display. This rea¢ rms the Private Label￿ s strength in positioning itself as
a low-cost alternative brand. Del Monte receives the most substantial boost from premium
shelf space, whereas the perception of Heinz varies little depending on Heinz￿ s shelf space
allocation. As the market leader for a considerable number of years, it may be that public
awareness of Heinz is so great that Heinz receives very little bene￿t from improved shelf
space.
Figure 4 illustrates this fact by comparing two demand curves for Heinz ketchup. The
solid line represents the demand for Heinz when it has premium shelf space, while the dashed
line represents the demand for Heinz when another brand has received the premium shelf
space. The latter demand curve, as we would anticipate, lies below the demand curve
Heinz faces when receiving premium shelf space. The di⁄erence between the two, however,
is negligible. The maximum horizontal di⁄erence between the curves (i.e. the di⁄erence in
shares for a given price level) is approximately 0.02. This implies that, at most, the premium
shelf space will increase Heinz￿ s market share by 2 percent.
The coe¢ cient on price (￿) is statistically signi￿cant and the predicted sign. Figure 5
shows the distribution of individual price coe¢ cients for each of the individuals ￿sampled￿
from the CPS.27 The distribution appears to be a normal distribution. Notice that some of
the coe¢ cients are positive, indicating that the individual￿ s utility actually increases with
price. While we may be able to think of products for which this seems reasonable, it does
27In total, characteristics for 10,000 individuals were included.
24not seem to be appropriate in the case of ketchup. Fortunately, only 2.02 percent of the
individuals have positive price coe¢ cients.28
In Table 6, estimated wholesale prices are presented. The reported wholesale prices are
averaged over all markets and all display con￿gurations. As the brand with the largest market
share and the highest average retail price, it is not surprising to see that Heinz charges the
highest wholesale price, followed by Hunts, and, ￿nally, Del Monte. Average retail mark-ups
(percentage) are also presented in Table 6. The mark-ups for Hunts (32.13 percent) and Del
Monte (29.75 percent) are of similar magnitude, while the mark-up for Heinz is considerably
lower (23.76 percent). A more thorough discussion of ketchup mark-ups appears below in
the section on goodness of ￿t.
Table 7 shows average conditional wholesale prices for the sample. These prices represent
the average estimated wholesale prices for each brand (w
j
j;w0
j). Both Heinz and Del Monte
charge their highest wholesale prices when their respective brand is in the premium space.
This is due to the fact that premium shelf space, in this model, acts as a demand shifter
(increase). The exception is Hunts, which has a higher wholesale price when not chosen for
the premium shelf space. This result seems counterintuitive. However, a possible explanation
might be that Hunts and Heinz are strategic complements, so Hunts bene￿ts from having
Heinz on display because this allows them to raise their price.
Display probabilities (￿) are shown in Table 8. Overall, Heinz has the highest average
probability of being chosen for display in each of the markets. The largest average display
probability is approximately 32 percent (Heinz) and the smallest is around 8 percent (Private
Label). Comparing the maximum and minimum display probabilities, Heinz appears to
receive the premium shelf space most often. This provides some support to the theory that
the market leader is most likely to receive premium space.
Merchandising allowance estimates, expressed as a percentage of the retailer￿ s conditional
pro￿t, are presented in Table 9.29 The average allowance payments range from 8 percent
28For comparison, in Nevo (1997) as much as 13 percent of the individual price coe¢ cients are positive,
while in Nevo (2001) only 0.7 percent are positive.
29I express the allowances as a percentage of pro￿t to ensure that the value of the allowances are not over-
or understated due to misspeci￿cation of the size of the market.
25(Hunts) to 9.5 percent (Del Monte). Heinz and Del Monte are the manufacturers that o⁄er
the largest allowances, which should not be surprising, given that Del Monte receives the
largest "quality boost" from the premium shelf space and Heinz has, of all brands, the largest
brand coe¢ cient (￿
j
j) when in the premium position.
7.2 Perception Maps
The use of perceptual maps or brand maps has become commonplace in the marketing
literature.30 The basic idea behind the technique is that every brand has a number of latent
attributes for which consumers have tastes and preferences. For feasibility, it is usually
assumed that each brand has two latent attributes. The perception map, then, is a two-
dimensional representation of each brand￿ s latent attributes.31 A brand￿ s position on the
perception map is independent from its price. The location of a brand depends solely on its
characteristics. When each brand is plotted on the same set of axes, a brand￿ s proximity to
the other brands represents how closely consumers view these two brands. The closer two
brands are plotted, the more similar these brands are perceived. The further apart, the more
dissimilar these brands are perceived.
While the perception map allows one to compare how consumers view di⁄erent brands,
it is important to note that a brand￿ s location in two-dimensional space cannot be used
to categorize that brand as being ￿better￿or ￿worse￿than another brand. For example,
consider the case of refrigerated orange juice. It is likely that consumers view Minute Maid
orange juice with pulp as a closer substitute to Tropicana orange juice with pulp than a
third brand that is pulp-free. This is what the perception map shows. It does not indicate
that orange juice with pulp is more attractive or ￿better￿than pulp-free orange juice.32
Figure 6 shows the perception map for Heinz, Hunts, Del Monte, and Private Label
when none of the brands has premium shelf space. This plot represents how consumers view
30My thanks to Jean-Pierre Dube for helping me understand the technique.
31From a technical standpoint, one recovers these latent attributes by performing a Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the brand dummies. For a more thorough description of this technique, please
see Elrod (1988), Elrod and Keane (1995), or Chintagunta, Dube, and Singh (2003).
32That would depend on individual preferences.
26the four brands, disregarding any bene￿t for better shelf space. Del Monte and Private
Label are grouped together closely in the upper right-hand corner, while Hunts and Heinz
are positioned in the lower left-hand corner. Though not paired quite so closely together,
the distance between Heinz and Hunts indicates that these two brands are seen as being
relatively similar. The close placement of Del Monte and the Private Label brand indicates
that consumers view these two products as being very similar, as well. An implication of
this is that the ￿premium￿brands are perceived di⁄erently than the low-cost brands.
Figure 7 illustrates how premium shelf space may alter the consumer perceptions shown
in Figure 6. Figure 7 plots the case where Del Monte is in the premium/display position. As
one can see, this ￿moves￿Del Monte closer to Heinz in the consumers￿eyes. The two brands
are, now, seen as being signi￿cantly more similar. This graph provides some intuition into
the bene￿ts of premium shelf space.
7.3 Goodness of Fit
It is useful to examine some tests which allow the performance of the structural model to be
evaluated.
7.3.1 Chi-square Tests
First, I conduct a traditional chi-square test to see how well the model￿ s predictions compare
with what is observed in the data. I examine (separately) how well the model predicts
each brand￿ s prices and also the percentage of units sold with merchandising (PUAM) for
each brand. In both cases, the null hypothesis tested is that the model￿ s prediction equals
reality. The results of these two tests, unfortunately, are mixed. With a test statistic of
approximately 0.35, I am unable to reject the hypothesis that the model￿ s predicted prices are
equal to the observed prices. On the other hand, the hypothesis that the model￿ s predicted
percentages of units sold with merchandising are equal to the observed values is rejected.
Upon closer examination of the values, it appears that the model generally understates how
many units each brand sells with merchandising (i.e. \ PUAM < PUAMobserved). If the
bene￿t of premium shelf space is being undervalued, that may provide some explanation as
27to why the estimated merchandising allowance payments are not particularly high.
7.3.2 Predicting Mark-Ups
The second test I present is more of a qualitative test. Thanks to work by Besanko, Dube,
and Gupta (2002), we have some information regarding the size of mark-ups on ketchup.
Using con￿dential supermarket data, the authors calculate the average percentage retail
mark-up on ketchup to be around 34.5 percent. This number is close to the percentage
retail mark-up implied their model (39.5 percent). Recall the average predicted mark-ups
presented in Table 6. For Hunts and Del Monte, the predicted mark-ups are 32.1 percent
and 29.7 percent, respectively. These numbers are close to the mark-ups observed in the
data, as well the mark-ups implied by Besanko, Dube, and Gupta￿ s model. The predicted
mark-up for Heinz is lower than the average observed mark-up, however.
Recall that, according to Desiraju￿ s (2001) model, retail mark-ups should be negatively
correlated with allowance payments. The empirical results above provide mixed support for
this prediction. Heinz and Del Monte have the lower mark-ups (compared with Hunts) and
they make the largest average merchandising allowances. However, Heinz, which has a lower
mark-up than Del Monte, makes lower allowance payments (on average) than Del Monte.
7.4 Counterfactual and Welfare Analysis
Whether merchandising allowances lead to higher prices (and, therefore, lower consumer
surplus) is one of the more interesting questions to explore. To provide some insight into this
question, I use the parameter estimates to conduct a counterfactual experiment. Speci￿cally,
￿rms will no longer be permitted to o⁄er merchandising allowances in order to obtain the
shelf space. Allowances are set to zero and the retailer chooses a brand for the premium
shelf space based solely on the conditional sales pro￿t. Manufacturers must strategically set
their wholesale prices in order to maximize their expected pro￿t. I assume that, as before,
each manufacturer chooses two conditional wholesale prices: one wholesale price when they
receive the premium shelf space and another price for when another brand has been chosen
for the premium shelf space.
28The wholesale prices are determined by maximizing the manufacturer￿ s expected pro￿t.







































































Note that, because the retailer takes the manufacturers￿wholesale prices as given when
setting retail prices, the retailer￿ s ￿rst order conditions are unchanged. Any change in the
retail price, then, is driven through changes in the wholesale prices.
The results of the counterfactual appear in Tables 10 through 13. As Table 10 shows,
mean expected retail prices are lower for all four brands when merchandising allowances are
forbidden. On a market-by-market basis, the average price of Heinz falls in almost 95 percent
of the markets when allowances are prohibited. On the other hand, the average price of the
Private Label falls in only about 57 percent of the markets. This rea¢ rms Sha⁄er￿ s (1991)
￿ndings regarding the use of slotting allowances and its impact on retail prices.
Counterfactual wholesale prices appear in Table 11. On average, the wholesale prices for
Heinz, Hunts, and Del Monte are all lower. The lower wholesale prices explain why retail
prices are also lower in the counterfactual. This result is similar to arguments put forth in
the vertical restraints literature. In the literature, it is not uncommon for manufacturers
to reduce their wholesale price in an e⁄ort to increase the retailer￿ s margin (thereby giving
the retailer a greater incentive to promote the manufacturer￿ s brand). In my model, when
merchandising allowances are not permitted, the wholesale price becomes the primary in-
strument for manufacturers to compete for the premium shelf space. It should not seem
surprising, then, that manufacturers lower their wholesale prices in an e⁄ort to make their
brand more attractive to the retailer. A question raised in the vertical restraints literature,
and not addressed here, is whether the retailer actually "passes the savings on" to the cus-
29tomer by lowering the retail price when wholesale prices are lowered. My model allows that
the retailer to re-optimize in the counterfactual and set their desired price.
The new display probabilities appear in Table 12. Relative to the state where merchandis-
ing allowances are permitted, the average display probabilities for each of the brands, except
Del Monte, rise in the counterfactual experiment. Recall from Table 9 that Del Monte of-
fered the largest merchandising allowances. It appears that the elimination of merchandising
allowances hampers Del Monte￿ s ability to compete for the premium shelf space. This loss
is translated into gains for the other three brands, including the Private Label brand which
becomes more likely to be chosen for the premium display space now that the retailer does
not have to forgo receiving an allowance payment when the Private Label brand is selected.
To help quantify the e⁄ect of eliminating merchandising allowances, I calculate the change
in consumer welfare associated with its elimination. To evaluate the change in consumer
welfare, I rely on consumer surplus. I measure the amount of money consumers would need
to be given (under the conditions of the counterfactual) in order to maintain their initial









































k ) is the display probability of brand k when merchandising allowances
are prohibited (allowed), and V noallow
ijjD=k (V allow
ijjD=k) is consumer i￿ s expected utility from consum-
ing brand j when brand k has the premium shelf space and merchandising allowances are
prohibited (allowed). Using these de￿nitions, the above equation may be interpreted as the
average expected maximized utility under the counterfactual minus the average expected
maximized utility with merchandising allowances. This value represents, in dollars, how
much better or worse o⁄ an individual consumer is because of merchandising allowances.33
I ￿nd that consumer surplus is diminished because of merchandising allowances. On
average, each consumer loses approximately $0.11 in welfare annually, due to merchandising
33By excluding income from an individual￿ s indirect utility function, I am inherently assuming that the
marginal utility of income is equal to 1.
30allowances. This aggregates to an annual decrease in welfare of approximately $10 million for
the metropolitan areas included in this sample. Two comments are worth noting here. First,
the ￿gures above refer only to the ketchup industry. However, it is di¢ cult to generalize on
the overall impact of merchandising allowances because there is likely to be a great deal of
variation across industries. The second comment is that I have not allowed for the possibility
that the retailer might choose to not carry all four brands. If merchandising allowances are
prohibited and the retailer decides that, without the allowance payment, it is not worthwhile
to carry all four brands, then we might actually see higher retail prices for the remaining
brands. In addition, the loss of choice may negatively impact consumer welfare, regardless
of any price change.34 When I compare manufacturer and retailer pro￿t with and without
merchandising allowances, I found that manufacturer pro￿t goes up when merchandising
allowances are eliminated. Retail pro￿t, on the other hand, goes down. The fact that we
often observe the use of merchandising allowances, then, might indicate the presence of retail
power.
8 Conclusions and Extensions
Merchandising allowances are an important part of the vertical channel. Firms are increas-
ingly relying on their use and yet our understanding of their impact is limited. This research
makes a step towards providing insight.
In this paper I estimated a structural model of merchandising allowances. The utility
function was a discrete-choice, random coe¢ cients model modi￿ed to allow space and pro-
motion to a⁄ect the consumer￿ s choices. To account for the way in which retail allowances
a⁄ect the decisions of manufacturers and retailers, the behavior of both groups is explicitly
modeled. Parameter estimates were then used to conduct a counterfactual to determine how
consumers, manufacturers, and retailers might be expected to respond to changes in the cur-
rent system. The results of the counterfactual imply that merchandising allowances decrease
34For example, Petrin (2002) develops a calculation for consumer welfare that takes into account the
addition (or possible deletion) of products from the consumer choice set.
31social welfare. While the practice allows retailers to increase their pro￿t, this bene￿t is more
than o⁄set by the dramatic decrease in consumer welfare.
One should be careful in relying too heavily on the aggregate welfare loss calculation pre-
sented above. There is a concern, particularly when discussing slotting allowances, that the
retailer may change not only the shelf allocation but, possibly, also the number of products
available. The welfare results in the preceding section do not account for this possibility or
its consequences.
Some of the points to be considered in future research include: observing actual shelf
space con￿gurations to account for the possible introduction/deletion of products from the
consumers￿choice set, alternative retailer-manufacturer bargaining approaches, and allowing
for multiple retailers to capture downstream competition as well as retailer size di⁄erences.
This research presents one of the ￿rst rigorous empirical examinations on merchandising
allowances. In this paper, I have attempted to add an empirical element to the theoretical
work begun by Sullivan, Sha⁄er, Desiraju, and others. It also extends and contributes to
the literature on structural models of vertical competition that follows from BLP￿ s seminal
paper. Rather than the de￿nitive word on allowances, I view this paper as the beginning of a
new vein of research aimed at empirically examining the a⁄ects of merchandising allowances.
32A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Simulating Individuals
Random coe¢ cients models add a degree of realism to conventional logit models by allowing
consumer taste parameters (￿;￿) to vary across individuals. This added realism comes at a
computational cost, however. More speci￿cally, the random coe¢ cients model requires the
econometrician to integrate over the distribution of demographics in order to obtain brand
market shares. While there are various ways to simulate over the demographic distribution, I
choose to approximate this integral by sampling a set of individuals from the Census Bureau￿ s
March Current Population Survey (CPS). This smooth simulator is preferable to the simple
frequency simulator for two reasons. Firstly, the frequency simulator requires a large number
of draws to ensure non-zero probabilities, whereas the smooth simulator can produce non-
zero probabilities from a single draw. Also, the frequency simulator, based on an indicator
function, is not smooth so the use of a gradient method in minimizing the objective function
is not possible.
The simulator I employ here requires the econometrician to sample individuals from each
metropolitan area and calculate the individual￿ s choice probabilities for each brand. So, for
each metropolitan area and year in the period, I sample 50 individuals.35 Simultaneously,
I also draw a (K + 1) ￿ 1 vector of individual taste parameters from the distribution of ￿.
Given the draws (￿;D) and the extreme value assumption on ", the predicted (unconditional)






































In order to compute the prices and implied sales, conditional on a speci￿c display
35The CPS is an annual survey so I use the same sampled individuals for each quarter in the given year.
33choice, in the estimation algorithm, it is necessary to compute conditional market shares
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Per Serving Information Heinz Hunts Del Monte
Calories 15 15 15
Sodium(mg) 190 190 190
C a r b . ( g ) 444
Sugars(g) 4 4 4











Atlanta, GA Hartford, CT Milwaukee, WI Raleigh, NC
Balt., MD - Wash., DC Houston, TX Nashville, TN Sacramento, CA
Birmingham, AL Indianapolis, IN New Orleans, LA Salt Lake City, UT
Chicago, IL Jacksonville, FL New York, NY San Antonio, TX
Cincinnati, OH Kansas City, MO Oklahoma City, OK San Diego, CA
Columbus, OH Little Rock, AR Omaha, NE San Francisco, CA
Dallas, TX Los Angeles, CA Orlando, FL Seattle, WA
Denver, CO Louisville, KY Philadelphia, PA St. Louis, MO
Detriot, MI Memphis, TN Phoenix, AZ Tampa, FL












South Northeast Midwest West National
Heinz 42.81 66.31 57.49 45.23 54.36
Hunts 31.38 8.64 16.33 16.99 17.81
Del Monte 13.01 2.82 6.75 17.36 9.01
Private Label 11.87 21.69 13.55 19.53 16.84
Combined 99.07 99.46 94.12 99.11 98.02
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.) (Std.Dev.)
Heinz Price 1.53 1.47 1.46 1.52 1.54
(0.149) (0.116) (0.112) (0.166) (0.153)
PUAM 41.81% 38.50% 38.33% 33.68% 34.41%
(0.163) (0.156) (0.151) (0.138) (0.133)
Hunts Price 1.39 1.29 1.28 1.33 1.36
(0.173) (0.128) (0.145) (0.201) (0.180)
PUAM 47.69% 45.92% 46.47% 44.92% 47.36%
(0.155) (0.192) (0.183) (0.166) (0.157)
Del Monte Price 1.18 1.17 1.13 1.18 1.21
(0.160) (0.145) (0.151) (0.170) (0.159)
PUAM 61.89% 53.13% 54.79% 51.89% 54.34%
(0.155) (0.192) (0.183) (0.166) (0.157)
Private Label Price 1.03 0.97 0.97 1.03 1.06
(0.146) (0.074) (0.064) (0.121) (0.117)
PUAM 37.32% 34.09% 32.86% 32.71% 31.79%
(0.153) (0.180) (0.160) (0.152) (0.154)














α -10.8515* Number of Markets 800
(4.0273)











(2.7346) (1.1312) (0.3540) (1.3479)
"Quality Boost" 0.1637 0.5048 1.3461 -3.0794
* - Significant at 5% level












Heinz 0.3773* 0.1844 0.3340
a
(0.1397) (0.1941) (0.1855)
Hunts 0.2091 -0.5214 -0.6785*
(0.2063) (0.4344) (0.3342)
Del Monte -0.0643 0.0621 -0.2071
(0.0824) (0.2485) (0.1726)
Private Label -0.2719* 0.6124 0.3676
(0.1266) (0.4082) (0.2467)
* - Significant at 5% level










Heinz Hunts Del Monte
Mean 1.1529 0.9658 0.8429
St. Dev. 0.3604 0.3642 0.5941










Heinz Hunts Del Monte
D =Own 1.3644 1.0365 1.0711










Heinz Hunts Del Monte Private Label
Mean 0.3219 0.2894 0.3123 0.0763
Max 0.9060 0.6680 0.5600 0.1140
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Heinz Hunts Del Monte
Mean 9.049% 8.020% 9.494%
Max 10.299% 9.901% 20.534%
Min 3.247% 0.001% 0.001%
TABLE 9






Heinz Hunts Del Monte Pr. Label
Average Expected Price per Unit 1.5025 1.3999 1.2029 0.9825
Heinz Hunts Del Monte Pr. Label
Average Expected Price per Unit 1.3573 1.2545 1.0786 0.9049
Price Change Lower Lower Lower Lower
% of Time Price is Higher with 
Allowances











Heinz Hunts Del Monte
Average Expected WholesalePrice per Unit 1.1529 0.9658 0.8429
Heinz Hunts Del Monte
Average Expected WholesalePrice per Unit 1.0153 0.8711 0.6871
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Heinz Hunts Del Monte Pr. Label
Mean 0.3391 0.3073 0.1917 0.1620
Max 0.4480 0.4160 0.3530 0.1860
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FIGURE 1: Basic Game Structure
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FIGURE 4: Demand Curves for Heinz 





FIGURE 5: Frequency Distribution of Price Coefficient 
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